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RESOLVING DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICTS
BETWEEN GENERATIONS
GEIR B. ASHEIM AND BERTIL TUNGODDEN
Abstract. We describe a new approach to the problem of resolving
distributional conflicts between an infinite and countable number of gen-
erations. We impose conditions on the social preferences that capture
the following idea: If indifference or preference holds between truncated
paths for infinitely many truncating times, then indifference or prefer-
ence holds also between the untruncated infinite paths. In this frame-
work we show (1) how such conditions illustrate the problem of combin-
ing Strong Pareto and impartiality in an intergenerational setting, and
(2) how equity conditions well-known from the finite setting can be used
to characterize different versions of leximin and utilitarianism.
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1. Introduction
The Suppes-Sen grading principle captures both a concern for equal treat-
ment of generations and the demand for efficiency. And it turns out that this
is all that is needed in order to justify sustainable solutions within reasonable
technological frameworks.1
However, there are two problems with this approach. First, it has been
argued that the Suppes-Sen grading principle cannot capture impartiality
among an infinite and countable number of generations in a satisfactory
manner (Liedekerke and Lauwers [7]). Second, even if we should accept this
justification for sustainability, there exists the further problem about how
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to resolve distributional conflicts between generations that go beyond the
sustainability question. In the following, we consider both these problems.
In Section 3, we look at the problem of intergenerational impartiality. Ac-
cording to Liedekerke and Lauwers [7, p. 163], formal impartiality is ensured
by imposing the axiom of Strong Anonymity (entailing indifference to any
permutation of utilities of an infinite number of generations). As is well-
known, this demand cannot be combined with the Strong Pareto axiom.
Liedekerke and Lauwers suggest to establish a framework where an accept-
able trade-off between the demands of impartiality and Strong Pareto can be
made. This implies a rejection of the Suppes-Sen grading principle, which
is characterized by Weak Anonymity (entailing indifference to any permu-
tation of utilities of only a finite number of generations) and Strong Pareto.
One might think that it should be possible to find some intermediate posi-
tion, where impartiality is extended beyond Weak Anonymity (by entailing
indifference to some – but not all – permutations of an infinite number of
generations) within a framework satisfying Strong Pareto, and hence, the
Suppes-Sen grading principle. As we illustrate in the present paper, this
is not an easy task. We attain a seemingly reasonable extension of Weak
Anonymity by considering conditions that specify that one infinite utility
path should be deemed indifferent to another infinite utility path if the head
of the former utility path is indifferent to the head of the latter at infinitely
many truncating times. However, as reported in Section 3, it is not possible
to establish an equivalence relation without coming in conflict with Strong
Pareto if impartiality is extended in this manner.
In Section 4, we look at how to resolve distributional conflicts between
generations that go beyond the sustainability question. In this respect, we
introduce similar conditions on (strict) preference that turn out to bring the
infinite intergenerational setting into line with the framework for distributive
justice in the finite setting. These conditions capture the idea that one
infinite utility path should be considered strictly better than another infinite
utility path if the head of the former is considered strictly better than the
latter at infinitely many truncating times. Within this framework, we show
how equity conditions well-known from the finite setting can be applied
to the debate on infinite intergenerational justice. Moreover, we provide
characterizations of some of the prominent positions in the literature.
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The formal framework and the justification for sustainability based on
the Suppes-Sen grading principle is introduced in Section 2, and concluding
remarks are provided in Section 5.
2. The framework
There is an infinite number of generations t = 1, 2, . . . . The utility level
of generation t is given by ut, which should be interpreted as the utility level
of a representative member of this generation. Initially (in Section 3 and the
first part of Section 4), we assume that the utilities need not be more than
ordinally measurable and level comparable, whereas later (in the second part
of Section 4) we consider utilities that are also cardinally measurable and
unit comparable.
A binary relation R over paths 1u = (u1, u2, . . . ) starting in period 1 ex-
presses social preferences over different intergenerational utility paths. Any
such binary relation R is throughout assumed to be reflexive and transitive
on the infinite Cartesian product R∞ of the set of real numbers R, where
∞ = |N| and N is the set of natural numbers. The social preferences R may
be complete or incomplete, with I denoting the symmetric part, i.e. indiffer-
ence, and P denoting the asymmetric part, i.e. (strict) preference. For any
path 1u = (u1, u2, . . . ) and any time T , 1uT = (u1, u2, . . . , uT ) denotes the
truncation of 1u at T , and 1u˜T is a permutation of 1uT having the property
that 1u˜T is non-decreasing. Refer to 1uT as the T -head and T+1u as the
T -tail of 1u.
In order to define sets of feasible paths we assume that the initial endow-
ment of generation t ≥ 1 is given by a n−dimensional (n < ∞) vector of
capital stocks kt. A generation t acts by choosing a utility level ut and a
vector of capital stocks kt+1 which is bequeathed to the next generation t+1.
For every t, the function Ft gives the maximum utility attainable for gener-
ation t if kt is inherited and kt+1 is bequeathed; i.e., ut ≤ Ft(kt, kt+1) has to
hold for any feasible utility-bequest pair (ut, kt+1) of generation t. Further-
more, it is assumed that the utility level of each generation cannot fall below
a certain lower bound u. This lower bound serves two purposes. First, u can
be interpreted as the subsistence level of any generation. Second, since there
are technological limitations on the accumulation of stocks in the course of
one period, Ft(kt, kt+1) < u can be used to capture that the bequest kt+1 is
infeasible given the inheritance kt. Hence, generation t’s utility-bequest pair
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(ut, kt+1) is said to be feasible at t given kt if u < ut ≤ Ft(kt, kt+1). The se-
quence 1F = (F1, F2, ...) characterizes the technology of the economy under
consideration. Given the technology 1F, a utility path tu = (ut, ut+1, . . . )
is feasible at t given kt if there exists a path t+1k = (kt+1, kt+2, . . . ) such
that, for all s ≥ t, generation s’s utility bequest pair (us, ks+1) is feasible at
s given ks.
A utility path 1v weakly Pareto-dominates another utility path 1u if every
generation is weakly better of in 1v than in 1u and some generation is strictly
better off. A utility path 1v is said to be efficient if there is no other feasible
utility path that weakly Pareto-dominates this path. A feasible utility path
1v is said to be R-maximal, if there exists no feasible path 1u such that
1uP 1v. A feasible utility path 1v is said to be R-optimal, if 1vR 1u for
any feasible path 1u. Any R-optimal path is R-maximal, while the converse
need not hold if R is incomplete.
Within this framework, the justification for sustainability in Asheim,
Buchholz, and Tungodden [2] rests on one technological assumption and two
conditions on the social preferences. First, the following domain restriction
is imposed on the technological framework.
Assumption 1 (Immediate Productivity of 1F). If tu = (ut, ut+1, . . . ) is
feasible at t given kt with ut > ut+1, then (ut+1, ut, ut+2, . . . ) is feasible and
inefficient at t given kt.
This assumption means that if a generation has higher utility than the next,
then its excess utility can be transferred at negative cost to its successor. It
thus generalizes positive net capital productivity to a setting where utilities
need not be more than ordinally measurable and level comparable. Second,
the following two conditions are imposed on the social preferences.
Condition SP (Strong Pareto). For any 1u, 1v ∈ R∞, if vt ≥ ut for all t
and vs > us for some s, then 1vP 1u.
Condition WA (Weak Anonymity). For any 1u, 1v ∈ R∞, if for some
finite permutation pi, vpi(t) = ut for all t, then 1v I 1u.2
Conditions SP and WA generate the Suppes-Sen grading principle RS. The
binary relation RS deems two paths to be indifferent if one is obtained from
2A permutation, i.e., a bijective mapping of {1, 2, . . . } onto itself, is finite whenever
there is a T such that pi(t) = t for any t > T .
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the other through a finite permutation, and one utility path to be preferred
to another if a finite permutation of the former weakly Pareto-dominates the
other. The Suppes-Sen grading principle RS is a subrelation3 to the social
preferences R if and only if R satisfies SP and WA.
Define sustainability in the following standard way.
Definition 1 (Sustainability). Generation t with inheritance kt is said to
behave in a sustainable manner if it chooses a feasible utility-bequest pair
(ut, kt+1) so that the constant utility path (ut, ut, . . . ) is feasible at t + 1
given kt+1. The utility path 1u = (u1, u2, . . . ) is called sustainable given
k1 if there exists 2k = (k2, k3, ...) such that every generation behaves in a
sustainable manner along (1k,1 u) = (k1, (u1, k2), (u2, k3), ...).
We can now state the justification for sustainability.
Proposition 1 (Asheim, Buchholz and Tungodden [2]). If the social pref-
erences R satisfy Strong Pareto and Weak Anonymity, and the technology
satisfies immediate productivity, then only sustainable utility paths are R-
maximal.
Proof. See Asheim, Buchholz, and Tungodden [2]. ¤
3. Intergenerational Impartiality
It has been argued that in order to capture the whole idea of impartiality
in an intergenerational setting, we have to deem any two utility paths as
equally good if they can be derived from each other by a permutation of
the utilities. The problem is that by making a permutation of the utilities
of an infinite number of generations, we may end up in a direct conflict
with Strong Pareto. By way of illustration, 1v = (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, . . . ) can be
attained from 1u = (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, . . . ) by a permutation where generation 2
gets the utility of generation 1, generation t the utility of generation t + 2
when t is an odd number, and generation t + 2 the utility of generation
t when t is an even number. On the basis of this fact, most economists
have chosen to adopt a weaker version of impartiality, which only endorses
indifference when one of the utility paths can be derived from the other by




′ and I ′′ and P ′ and P ′′ denoting the symmetric and asymmetric
parts of R′ and R′′, respectively.
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a finite number of permutations. It is this weak version of impartiality that
is captured by Weak Anonymity.
This move, however, does not seem to be entirely satisfactory, because
as pointed out by Liedekerke and Lauwers [7, p. 165] (in the present termi-
nology and notation): “Weak [Anonymity] only affects T -head of the utility
stream and not its T -tail for large enough T . But the T -tail of an infi-
nite utility stream is infinitely larger than its T -head, therefore the [W]eak
[Anonymity] condition only guarantees impartiality for a (negligibly) small
part of the utility stream”. Liedekerke and Lauwers accordingly suggest that
we should adopt a framework that incorporates a trade-off between Weak
Anonymity and Strong Pareto.
Weak Anonymity can certainly be criticized along the lines suggested by
Liedekerke and Lauwers. Here we will illustrate the problems associated
with extending indifference between infinite paths without coming in con-
flict with Strong Pareto, through an analysis that will set the stage for the
characterizations we present in Section 4.
Consider the following condition.
Condition WIC (Weak Indifference Continuity). If 1u = (u1, u2, . . . ) and
1v = (v1, v2, . . . ) are two utility paths, and there exists some Tˆ ≥ 1 such
that for all T ≥ Tˆ , (1vT , T+1u) I 1u, then 1v I 1u.
WIC states that an infinite utility path should be considered indifferent to
another infinite utility path if the head of the former is considered indifferent
to the latter at every point in time beyond a certain initial phase.
It is straightforward to see that WIC and WA generate the following
equivalence (i.e., reflexive, symmetric, and transitive) relation.
Definition 2. For any two utility paths 1u and 1v, the relation 1uRMW 1v
holds if there exists some Tˆ ≥ 1 such that for all T ≥ Tˆ , 1u˜T = 1v˜T .
Proposition 2. The relation RMW satisfies Weak Anonymity and Weak In-
difference Continuity, and RMW is a subrelation to any R satisfying Weak
Anonymity and Weak Indifference Continuity.
Proof. Trivial. ¤
However, if our aim is to extend impartiality to cases involving an infinite
number of generations, nothing is gained by combining Weak Anonymity
with Weak Indifference Continuity.
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Proposition 3. For any 1v and 1u, 1v IMW 1u if and only if for some T ≥ 1,
1v˜T = 1u˜T and T+1v = T+1u.
Proof. The if-part of the proposition is trivial, and thus we will only prove
the only-if part. Suppose 1v IMW 1u. In that case, there exists some Tˆ ≥ 1
such that for all T ≥ Tˆ , 1v˜T = 1u˜T and 1v˜T+1 = 1u˜T+1. Hence, vT+1 =
uT+1, and thus Tˆ+1v = Tˆ+1u. The result follows. ¤
Proposition 3 shows that if Weak Anonymity and Weak Indifference Conti-
nuity deem two paths indifferent when one is derived from the other through
an infinite permutation, then the permutation has no consequence for the
levels of utilities that are assigned to generations beyond some finite point
in time. Hence, these cases are already covered by Weak Anonymity.
A stronger operationalization of impartiality can be attained by combin-
ing Weak Anonymity with the following condition.
Condition SIC (Strong Indifference Continuity). If 1u = (u1, u2, . . . ) and
1v = (v1, v2, . . . ) are two utility paths, and for any Tˆ ≥ 1, there exists a
T ≥ Tˆ such that (1vT , T+1u) I 1u, then 1v I 1u.
SIC means that an infinite utility path should be considered indifferent to
another infinite utility path if, at any point in time, there is a future point in
time at which the head of the former is considered indifferent to the latter.
If we combine Strong Indifference Continuity and Weak Anonymity, then
we are able to express impartiality in a large number of cases covering per-
mutations of an infinite number of generations. As an illustration, compare
1v = (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, . . . ) and 1w = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, . . . ), where 1v can be at-
tained from 1w by a permutation of the utilities of generation 1 and 2, 3 and
4, 5 and 6, and so on. In this case, as argued by Liedekerke and Lauwers [7,
p. 162], equal treatment of generations should imply indifference between
1v and 1w. This cannot be captured by Weak Anonymity alone. While if
we combine WA and SIC, then it appears that we attain the desired conclu-
sion. However, any equivalence relation that satisfies WA and SIC comes in
conflict with Strong Pareto.
Proposition 4. If RMS is the transitive closure of some R satisfying Weak
Anonymity and Strong Indifference Continuity, then RMS does not satisfy
Strong Pareto.
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Proof. Consider the following paths: 1u = (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, . . . ), 1v = (1, 0, 1,
0, 1, 0, . . . ), and 1w = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, . . . ). Since R satisfies WA and SIC, it
follows that 1v I 1w and 1w I 1u. Since RMS is the transitive closure of R,
we have that 1v IMS 1u. This shows that R
M
S does not satisfy SP. ¤
Props. 2–4 illustrate the problems associated with extending indifference
between infinite paths. On the one hand, if we add WIC to Weak Anonymity
we obtain the same equivalence relation that is implied by Weak Anonymity
alone. On the other hand, any equivalence relation that satisfies SIC and
Weak Anonymity comes in conflict with Strong Pareto.
Let I and P be the symmetric and asymmetric parts of a binary relation
R. Write IT := {(1v, 1u)| (1vT , T+1u) I 1u} and I∞ := {(1v, 1u)| 1v I 1u}.





IT ⊆ I∞ ,





IT ⊆ I∞ .
Hence, WIC and SIC correspond to different kinds of continuity at infinity
for the symmetric part I. The analogous kinds of continuity at infinity can
be defined for the asymmetric part P . We show in the next section that
such preference continuity can be used to characterize different versions of
leximin and utilitarianism.
4. Characterizations
As stated in Section 2 we can, following Asheim, Buchholz, and Tungod-
den [2], justify sustainability through the conditions of Strong Pareto and
Weak Anonymity. The relation generated by SP and WA – the Suppes-Sen
grading principle, RS – is, however, incomplete. As reported in Section 3
it seems difficult to extend indifference beyond WA without coming conflict
with SP. In the present section, we pose another problem: how to resolve
distributional conflicts between generations when comparing paths that are
RS-maximal. This problem amounts to extending (strict) preference beyond
what is implied by the Suppes-Sen grading principle.
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From a technical viewpoint, WIC and SIC establish a nice link to the
standard finite setting of distributive justice. Within the framework of WIC
and SIC, the comparison of any two infinite utility paths amounts to com-
paring an infinite number of utility paths each containing a finite number
of generations. Similarly, we may apply well-known equity conditions and
arguments from the traditional literature on distributive justice more gener-
ally if we introduce conditions similar to WIC and SIC for the asymmetric
part of the social preferences. In this respect, there are two options.
Condition WPC (Weak Preference Continuity). If 1u = (u1, u2, . . . ) and
1v = (v1, v2, . . . ) are two utility paths, and there exists some Tˆ ≥ 1 such
that for all T ≥ Tˆ , (1vT , T+1u)P 1u, then 1vP 1u.
Condition SPC (Strong Preference Continuity). If 1u = (u1, u2, . . . ) and
1v = (v1, v2, . . . ) are two utility paths, and there exists some Tˆ ≥ 1 such
that for all T ≥ Tˆ , (1vT , T+1u)R 1u, and for any Tˆ ≥ 1, there exists a
T ≥ Tˆ such that (1vT , T+1u)P 1u, then 1vP 1u.






{(1v, 1u)| (1vT , T+1u)R 1u} .
If R is complete for comparisons between paths having the same tail, then
R denotes the set pairs (1v, 1u) satisfying that beyond some Tˆ there exists
no T such that 1u is preferred to (1vT , T+1u). Write PT := {(1v, 1u) ∈
R| (1vT , T+1u)P 1u} and P∞ := {(1v, 1u)| 1vP 1u}. Then WPC means





PT ⊆ P∞ ,





PT ⊆ P∞ .
In the following we illustrate how this framework can be used to character-
ize the intergenerational versions of the Rawlsian leximin principle and the
utilitarian principle.
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4.1. Leximin. We start with the Rawlsian leximin principle. It has been
stated as follows in the infinite case (see, e.g., Asheim [1, p. 2]), where “S”
indicates that RLS will be shown to correspond to the Strong Preference
Continuity:
Definition 3 (S-Leximin). For any two utility paths 1u and 1v, the S-
Leximin relation 1vRLS 1u holds if there exists some Tˆ ≥ 1 such that for all
T ≥ Tˆ , either 1v˜T = 1u˜T or there is a s ∈ {1, . . . , T} with v˜t = u˜t for all
1 ≤ t < s and v˜s > u˜s.
Alternatively, we can give a weaker formulation of leximin, RLW, that will be
shown to correspond to the Weak Preference Continuity.
Definition 4 (W-Leximin). For any two utility paths 1u and 1v, 1v ILW 1u
holds if there exists some Tˆ ≥ 1 such that for all T ≥ Tˆ , 1v˜T = 1u˜T .
Moreover, 1vPLW 1u holds if there exists some Tˆ ≥ 1 such that for all T ≥ Tˆ ,
there is a s ∈ {1, ..., T} with v˜t = u˜t for all 1 ≤ t < s and v˜s > u˜s.
Let us start out by characterizing RLS . It is well-known that the lex-
imin principle covering finite cases can be characterized by the Suppes-Sen
grading principle and the equity condition suggested by Hammond [4, 5].
Condition HE (Hammond Equity). If 1u = (u1, u2, . . . ) and 1v = (v1, v2,
. . . ) are two utility paths, and there exists j, k such that uj > vj > vk > uk
and ui = vi for all i 6= j, k, then 1vR 1u.
However, in general it is not straightforward to translate this result into the
infinite case.4 However, by applying SPC, we obtain the following charac-
terization.
Proposition 5. RLS is a subrelation to R if and only if R satisfies Strong
Pareto, Weak Anonymity, Hammond Equity, and Strong Preference Conti-
nuity.
Proof. (If) Assume that R satisfies SP, WA, HE, and SPC. According to the
definition of a subrelation (cf. footnote 3), we have to show that, for any 1u,
1v, 1v ILS 1u implies 1v I 1u and 1vP
L
S 1u implies 1vP 1u. This naturally
divides the if part of the proof into two subparts.
4Lauwers [6] characterizes the maximin relation by a version of Hammond Equity within
a framework where Strong Pareto is relaxed.
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(1) Consider any 1u, 1v such that 1v ILS 1u. By definition of R
L
S , there
exists some Tˆ ≥ 1 such that for all T ≥ Tˆ , 1v˜T = 1u˜T . By WA and Prop. 3,
it follows that 1v I 1u.
(2) Consider any 1u, 1v such that 1vPLS 1u. By definition of R
L
S , for any
Tˆ ≥ 1, there exist T ≥ Tˆ and s ∈ {1, ..., T} such that v˜t = u˜t for all 1 ≤ t < s
and v˜s > u˜s. I.e., for any such T ≥ Tˆ , the sth worst off in 1u˜T is worse off
than the sth worst off in 1v˜T . For given T ≥ Tˆ , we can now construct a
utility path 1uˆ by means of a sequence of steps involving conflicts between
two generations. The first step involves a conflict between the sth worst
off and the (s + 1)st worst off, the second step a conflict between the sth
worst off and the (s + 2)nd worst off, and so on until the conflict between
the sth worst off and the best off is included in the sequence. In each step,
let the the sth worst off generation in 1u˜T gain less than 1/(T −s+1) of the
difference between the utility level this generation attains in 1u˜T and 1v˜T ,
and let the better off generation in 1u˜T attain the same as the minimum
of what this generation gets in 1u˜T and 1v˜T . Let 1uˆT be the path derived
from 1u˜T by this sequence. By HE (and SP in cases for which the better off
generation does not have higher utility in 1u˜T ), each such step is at least a
weak improvement according to R. Hence, by transitivity we have that
(1uˆT , T+1u)R (1u˜T , T+1u) .
Since R satisfies SP, it follows that
(1v˜T , T+1u)P (1uˆT , T+1u) ,
while WA implies that
(1vT , T+1u) I (1v˜T , T+1u) and (1u˜T , T+1u) I 1u .
Hence, by transitivity, (1vT , T+1u)P 1u. Since, for any Tˆ ≥ 1, there exists a
T ≥ Tˆ such that this holds and R satisfies SPC, it now follows that 1vP 1u.
(Only if) Assume that RLS is a subrelation to R. Then it is trivial to
establish that R satisfies SP, WA, and HE. To show that R satisfies SPC,
assume that for any Tˆ ≥ 1, there exists a T ≥ Tˆ such that (1vT , T+1u)P 1u.
Since RLS is a subrelation to R and R
L
S is complete for comparisons between
paths having the same tail, we have that for any Tˆ ≥ 1, there exists a T ≥ Tˆ
such that (1vT , T+1u)PLS 1u. By definition of R
L
S , this entails that 1vP
L
S 1u,
which in turn implies 1vP 1u since RLS is a subrelation to R. Hence, 1vP 1u
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holds if for any Tˆ ≥ 1, there exists a T ≥ Tˆ such that (1vT , T+1u)P 1u.
Thus, we have established that R satisfies SPC. ¤
This result deals with an immediate objection to the Rawlsian leximin
position — that the leximin principle is implausible because it assigns ab-
solute priority to the interests of the worst off generation in cases where it
is in conflict with the interest of an infinite number of future generations.
Intuitively, this seems a reasonable counterargument. However, the propo-
sition shows that this objection does not approach the problem head-on,
at least not if we accept the framework of a reflexive and transitive binary
relation as the basis of normative evaluation of intergenerational justice. In
this framework, Prop. 5 tells us that our view on intergenerational justice in
general can be determined by considering a particular set of two-generation
conflicts. If we agree on assigning absolute priority to the worse off in such a
conflict, then we have to assign absolute priority to the worse off in general.
Hence, our result provides a defense for the leximin principle in the infinite
setting since it seems less difficult to accept the two-generation claim.
An analogous result can be established for RLW.
Proposition 6. RLW is a subrelation to R if and only if R satisfies Strong
Pareto, Weak Anonymity, Hammond Equity, and Weak Preference Conti-
nuity.
Proof. The result follows by trivial modification of the parts of the proof of
Prop. 5 that involve SPC. ¤
We must impose an assumption on the technological framework in order
to ensure that there exists a maximal path according to RLS (and thus R
L
W,
since RLW is a subrelation to R
L
S). In this respect, the following domain
restriction is of particular interest.
Assumption 2 (Eventual Productivity of 1F). For any t and kt, there exists
a feasible and efficient path with constant utility.
Eventual productivity is fulfilled for technologies usually considered in the
context of sustainability (see Asheim, Buchholz, and Tungodden [2]). If we
take this restriction into account, we can provide a complete justification for
an egalitarian approach to intergenerational justice.
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Proposition 7. If the technology satisfies Eventual Productivity, and R sat-
isfies Strong Pareto, Weak Anonymity, Hammond Equity, and Weak Pref-
erence Continuity, then the feasible and efficient path with constant utility
is the unique R-optimal path.
Proof. Eventual productivity guarantees the existence of an efficient utility
path 1v with constant utility. Since any alternative feasible path 1u provides
at least one generation with lower utility than this constant level, it follows
that 1vPLW 1u. Hence, 1vP
L
W 1u for any other feasible path. It follows
from Prop. 6 that RLW is a subrelation to R. Therefore, 1vP 1u for any
other feasible path. Hence, 1v is R-optimal, and no other feasible path is
R-optimal. ¤
It follows that the feasible and efficient path with constant utility is preferred
to any other feasible path according to any binary relation to which RLW is
a subrelation; in particular, this holds for RLS . Hence, the egalitarian path
is the unique optimal path also under the stronger version of leximin.
4.2. Utilitarianism. The utilitarian overtaking criterion, introduced by
von Weisza¨cker [8], represents an important alternative approach to inter-
generational justice.5 As with leximin, there are two versions to consider.
Definition 5 (Catching Up). For any two utility paths 1u and 1v, the
Catching Up relation 1vRUS 1u holds if there exists some Tˆ ≥ 1 such that
for all T ≥ Tˆ , ∑Tt=1 vt ≥∑Tt=1 ut.
Definition 6 (Overtaking). For any two utility paths 1u and 1v, 1v IUW 1u
holds if there exists some Tˆ ≥ 1 such that for all T ≥ Tˆ ,∑Tt=1 vt =∑Tt=1 ut.




As an illustration, compare 1v = (2, 0, 2, 0, . . . ) and 1u = (1, 1, 1, 1, . . . ).
Here 1vPUS 1u since 1u never catches up with 1v, while the utility paths are
incomparable according to RUW since 1v never overtakes 1u. It is of interest
to note that von Weisza¨cker [8, p. 85] defines preference by overtaking (i.e.,
1v is preferred to 1u if 1vPUW 1u), and optimality by catching up (i.e., 1v is
optimal if 1vRUS 1u for any feasible path 1u).
5To analyze “overtaking” and “catching up” we must consider utilities that are also
cardinally measurable and unit comparable.
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Also in the case of these utilitarian criteria, we may appeal to a set of
two-generation conflicts in order to provide characterization.6
Condition 2U (2-Generation Utilitarianism). If 1u = (u1, u2, . . . ) and
1v = (v1, v2, . . . ) are two utility paths, and there exists j, k such that
0 < uj − vj ≤ vk − uk and ui = vi for all i 6= j, k, then 1vR 1u.
By introducing 2-Generation Utilitarianism we overcome an immediate ob-
jection to the catching up and overtaking criteria, namely that these criteria
allow a large number of smaller gains for many generations to outweigh a
greater loss for a single generation. The following results show that this
is only a consequence of wanting to follow in two-generation conflicts the
interests of the generation that experiences the greater loss.
Proposition 8. RUS is a subrelation to R if and only if R satisfies Strong
Pareto, 2-Generation Utilitarianism, and Strong Preference Continuity.
Proof. (If) Assume that R satisfies SP, 2U, and SPC. According to the
definition of a subrelation (cf. footnote 3), we have to show that, for any 1u,
1v, 1v IUS 1u implies 1v I 1u and 1vP
U
S 1u implies 1vP 1u. This naturally
divides the if part of the proof into two subparts.
(1) Consider any 1u, 1v such that 1v IUS 1u. By definition of R
U
S , there
exists a Tˆ ≥ 1 such that for all T ≥ Tˆ , ∑Tt=1 vt = ∑Tt=1 ut and ∑T+1t=1 vt =∑T+1
t=1 ut. Hence, vT+1 = uT+1, and thus Tˆ+1v = Tˆ+1u. Since
∑Tˆ
t=1 vt =∑Tˆ
t=1 ut we can establish, for each of 1vTˆ and 1uTˆ , a sequence of steps
involving conflicts between two generations. In each step, let the gain for
the worse off generation be equal the loss for the better off generation.
This procedure leads to two egalitarian Tˆ -heads, 1vˆTˆ and 1uˆTˆ , where the
constant utility of the former equals that of the latter. By 2U, each such
step is indifferent according to R. Hence, by transitivity, we have that
(1vTˆ , Tˆ+1u) I (1vˆTˆ , Tˆ+1u) and (1uˆTˆ , Tˆ+1u) I 1u .
Since 1vˆTˆ = 1uˆTˆ and Tˆ+1v = Tˆ+1u, it follows by transitivity that 1v I 1u.
(2) Consider any 1u, 1v such that 1vPUS 1u. By definition of R
U
S , for any
Tˆ ≥ 1, there exists a T ≥ Tˆ such that ∑Tt=1 vt > ∑Tt=1 ut. For this T we
can now establish, for each of 1vT and 1uT , a sequence of steps involving
conflicts between two generations. In each step, let the gain for the worse off
6For a discussion of the related result in the finite setting, see d’Aspremont [3].
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generation be equal to the loss for the better off generation. This procedure
leads to two egalitarian T -heads, 1vˆT and 1uˆT , where the constant utility
of the former is higher than that of the latter. By 2U, each such step is
indifferent according to R. Hence, by transitivity, we have that
(1vT , T+1u) I (1vˆT , T+1u) and (1uˆT , T+1u) I 1u .
Since R satisfies SP, it follows that
(1vˆT , T+1u)P (1uˆT , T+1u) .
Hence, by transitivity, (1vT , T+1u)P 1u. Since, for any Tˆ ≥ 1, there exists a
T ≥ Tˆ such that this holds and R satisfies SPC, it now follows that 1vP 1u.
(Only if) Assume that RUS is a subrelation to R. Then it is trivial to
establish that R satisfies SP and 2U. Arguments similar to those used in the
only-if part of the proof of Prop. 5 to show that R satisfies SPC when RLS is
a subrelation to R, can be used here to establish that R satisfies SPC. ¤
Proposition 9. RUW is a subrelation to R if and only if R satisfies Strong
Pareto, 2-Generation Utilitarianism, and Weak Preference Continuity.
Proof. The result follows by trivial modification of the parts of the proof of
Prop. 8 that involve SPC. ¤
Since 2U entails WA, any social preferences to which one of these utilitarian
criteria is a subrelation satisfy the Suppes-Sen grading principle.
It is more difficult to establish conditions that guarantee that there exists
an optimal (or maximal) path according to the catching up and overtaking
criteria, and we leave such a task for another occasion.
5. Conclusion
By introducing two new conditions, Strong and Weak Preference Conti-
nuity, we have shown how it is possible to apply interesting equity conditions
well-known from the finite setting in order to resolve distributional conflicts
between an infinite number of generations. We have applied our analysis to
different versions of leximin and utilitarianism, but there are other possibil-
ities worthy of exploration.
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